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Abstract
We study interactions among players in cooperative games. We propose a new
interaction index called Shapley-Taylor interaction index. It decomposes the value
of the game into terms that model the interactions between subsets of players,
analogous to how the Taylor series represents a function in terms of its derivatives
of various orders.
We axiomatize the method using the standard Shapley axioms—linearity,
dummy, symmetry and efficiency—and also an additional axiom that we call the
interaction distribution axiom. This new axiom explicitly characterizes how inter-
actions are distributed for a class of games called interaction games.
We contrast the Shapley-Taylor interaction index against the previously pro-
posed Shapley Interaction index and the Banzhaf interaction index (cf. [2]).
1 Motivation and Summary of Results
The well-known Shapley value [8] distributes surplus or cost among the players of a
cooperative game [9]. It has also been used to study feature/variable importance in statis-
tics and machine learning, both in the context of predictions for a single input(cf. [4])
and globally across several inputs(cf. [5]).
The Shapley value has also been generalized [6] to study interactions between
players, i.e, whether two players i and j have an interest to cooperate, have a disincentive
to cooperate, or whether they simply act independently. The motivation to studying
interactions is to develop an understanding of the game beyond just the power of
individual players. This generalization of the Shapley value is called the Shapley
interaction index. It was first proposed by [6] to study pairwise interactions, and then
generalized in [2] to study interactions of all sizes; the same paper also provides an
axiomatic treatment of the Shapley interaction index.
Before we further discuss Shapley interaction indices , let us revisit the Shapley
value. The central concept in the Shapley value is that of the marginal, i.e., the change
in the cost/value function v by the addition of a player, i.e. δiv(S) = v(S ∪ i)− v(S).
In general, for a nonlinear function v, the value of this expression depends on the set
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S ⊆ N \ {i} at which we compute the marginal and there are several choices for this
set S. The Shapley value defines a random process that implicitly prescribes a certain
weighting over these sets. Given an ordering of the players, add the players one by one
in this order. Each player i gets ascribed the marginal value of adding it to the players
that precede it. The Shapley value of the player i is the expected value of this marginal
over an ordering of players chosen uniformly at random.
The Shapley Value is known to be the unique method that satisfies four axioms:
efficiency (the values of all the players sum to the value of the set function), symmetry
(symmetric players receive equal shares), linearity (the sum of the shares of a player
from two games is identical to the share of the player in the game formed by the sum of
the two games) and the dummy (if the marginal value of a player is zero for every set S,
it has a zero value/share) axioms.
Let us now discuss interaction indices. For simplicity, let us consider pairwise
interactions. The concept analogous to the marginals for pairwise interactions is:
δijv(S) = [v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ i)− v(S ∪ j) + v(S)] (1)
Let us convince ourselves that expression 1 models the notion of an interaction.
Expression 1 can be expressed as the difference between two marginals δiv(S ∪ {j})
and δiv(S). If i and j don’t interact, then the two marginals have equal value and
the expression 1 evaluates to zero. Similarly, if the addition of j helps (hurts) i, the
expression 1 is positive (resp. negative).
However, for a nonlinear function v, the value of δijv(S) will depend on the set
S ⊆ N \ {i, j} at which it is evaluated. The Shapley interaction index [2] describes a
procedure that implicitly defines a weighting over the sets S. We fuse the two players i
and j into a dummy player. We then pick an ordering over the resulting n− 1 players,
compute the expression δijv(S) with the set S consisting of all the elements that precede
the dummy player; the Shapley interaction index is the expected value of δij over an
ordering chosen uniformly at random over the n− 1 players.
In [2], it is shown that the Shapley interaction index is the unique method that
satisfies variants of the linearity, symmetry, dummy axioms, and an additional axiom
called the recursive axiom. The recursive axiom requires that the interaction index for a
pair of players i, j is equal to the difference in the Shapley value of player i in a game
with player j omnipresent and the Shapley value of player i in a game with player j
absent. The recursive axiom can informally be interpreted as “how does the presence or
absence of player j affect the share of player i”.
However, unlike the Shapley value, the Shapley interaction value does not satisfy
efficiency. (For the Shapley value, it is easy to see that the process that defines it yields
efficiency for each ordering). The lack of efficiency makes it hard to use the Shapley
Interaction Value to reason about a question like: "what fraction of the value of the
game results from positive interactions among players?". Because without efficiency,
the interaction values are no longer commensurate with the value of the game.
The main motivation of this paper is to resurrect the efficiency axiom in the study
of interactions. Informally, we ask what is the best kth order representation" of the
interactions that is also efficient". We call k the order of explanation. This approach is
analogous to Taylor expansions that are truncated at the kth term. Specifically, using a
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quantity called the Lagrangian remainder at the kth term enables the Taylor expansion
to sum to the function value irrespective of the order of the function.
We axiomatize the Shapley-Taylor indices in Section 3. Our approach drops the
recursive axiom and uses a new axiom called the interaction distribution axiom. This
axiom explicitly defines how interactions are distributed for a class of games called
interaction games.
In Section 3.4, we make the connection between the Taylor expansions and the
Shapley-Taylor indices mathematically precise. We discuss that the Shapley-Taylor
indices result from applying the Taylor series with the standard Lagrangian remainder to
the multilinear extension of the game. Multilinear extension, first studied by [6], turn a
discrete game into a continuous one by making every player i join the game with some
probability xi. (Equation 8 makes this precise.)
Just like the Shapley value, Shapley-Taylor indices can also be computed as an
expectation over orderings chosen uniformly at random. We will formally define
Shapley-Taylor indices in Section 2. Let us informally discuss the index for an order
of explanation k = 2, i.e., the index specifies values for individual players and pairs of
players. The indices for an individual player i is just the marginal δiv(∅). Intuitively,
these indices capture what a player can accomplish alone, all other contributions of the
player will be captured through pairwise interactions with other players.
To compute the indices for pairs, we pick an ordering of the players, and ascribe
to each pair of players the expression 1 computed at the set S of players that precede
both i and j in the ordering. (Notice that other elements could occur in between i and
j in the ordering, but are ignored.) The Shapley Taylor interaction index for a pair is
the expectation of this quantity over an ordering chosen uniformly at random. Just like
Shapley interaction indices , Shapley-Taylor indices prescribes a weighting over the sets
S in Equation 1. However, unlike the Shapley interaction index, this weighting results
in efficiency (the sum of the pairwise and singleton terms is equal to v(N)).
Another interaction index called the Banzhaf Interaction Index (cf. [7]). It is based
on the Banzhaf power index [1] instead of the Shapley value. The axiomatization of this
index was similar to that of the Shapley interaction index; the only difference is that the
recursive axiom uses the Banzhaf value instead of the Shapley value.
Finally, we compare the Shapley-Taylor interaction index with the Shapley interac-
tion index and the Banzhaf interaction index by applying them to various games. The
results of applying Shapley-Taylor indices are arguably more intuitive. The other two
methods produce index values that are not commensurate either with the amount of
interaction present in the game, or with the value of the game, making interpretation
hard. Example 2.1 presents an illustration of this, and Section 4 elaborates.
1.1 Notation
Let N be the set of players. We consider a game on N to be a set function v : 2N → R
such that v(∅) = 0. To simplify the notation, we omit braces for singleton sets and write
S ∪ i instead of S ∪ {i} and S ∪ ij instead of S ∪ {i, j} . We denote the cardinalities
of a set S, T etc. using lowercase letters: s, t.
Define δiv(S) = v(S∪i)−v(S) and δijv(S) = v(S∪ij)−v(S∪i)−v(S∪j)+v(S),
where i, j 6∈ S. These are discrete equivalents of first and second order derivatives. In
3
general, for T ⊆ N \ S, we define the discrete derivative with respect to set S as:
δSv(T ) =
∑
W⊆S
(−1)w−sv(W ∪ T ) (2)
We use a fixed number k as the order of explanation to mean that we’ll compute the
Shapley-Taylor indices for subsets of size up to k. For instance, k = 2 corresponds to
interaction indices for singleton sets as well as pairs of players. For a set S such that
|S| ≤ k, IkS(v) denotes the value of the interaction index for the set S.
2 Shapley-Taylor Interaction Index
In this section we formally define Shapley-Taylor indices . Section 1 discussed Shapley-
Taylor indices informally for the case when the order of explanation was k = 2. As in
the k = 2 case, Shapley-Taylor indices are defined by random process over orderings of
players. Let pi = (i1, i2, . . . , in) be an ordering. Let piik = {i1, . . . , ik−1} be the set
of predecessors of ik in pi. For a fixed ordering pi and a set, we define Shapley-Taylor
indices IkS,pi(v) as follows:
IkS,pi(v) =
{
δSv(∅) if |S| < k
δSv(pi
S) if |S| = k, (3)
Here, piS is defined as ∩i∈Spii, the set of elements that precede all of the elements in
S. Let us briefly discuss the three cases. When the size of the interaction term is strictly
less than the order of explanation, its interaction value (for the fixed permutation) is
simply equal to the the discrete derivative (Equation 2) at the empty set. Notice that this
quantity does not depend on the permutation itself. When the order of approximation
is k = 2, this is just the marginal. When the size of the interaction term is equal to
the order of explanation, its interaction value (for the fixed permutation) is equal to the
discrete derivative at the largest set of elements that precede all of the elements of S.
when the order of approximation is k = 2, the discrete derivatives match Equation 1.
The Shapley-Taylor indices are defined as the expectation of IkS,pi(v) over an order-
ing of the N players chosen uniformly at random:
IkS(v) = Epi(IkS,pi(v)) (4)
A noteworthy special case is k = 1. Here the first case of Equation 3 does not
occur and the discrete derivatives correspond to marginals. The resulting definition is
precisely the well-known Shapley value. Shapley-Taylor indices thus generalize the
Shapley value.
We also define two other previously proposed interaction indices:
• Shapley interaction index([2]) The Shapley interaction index for a coalition
S ⊆ N in a game v ⊆ GN is defined as:
ISh(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
(n− t− s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)! δSv(T ) (5)
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• Banzhaf interaction index([7]) The Banzhaf interaction index for a coalition
S ⊆ N in a game v ⊆ GN is defined as:
IB(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−s
δSv(T ) (6)
In Theorem 3 below, we derive an alternate expression for Shapley-Taylor in-
dices that is similar in structure to definitions of these two interaction indices.
The Shapley interaction index can also defined by a random order process. To
compute the interaction index for a set S, the set S is fused into a dummy player. The
players are ordered randomly as before and the discrete derivative δS is evaluated at
the set of players which precede the dummy player in the ordering. The combinatorial
weights that occur in Equation 5 arise from this random process. In contrast, the Banzhaf
interaction index arises from a simple averaging of discrete derivatives.
2.1 Example
We illustrate the various methods on a simple three player majority game: v(S) = 1 if
|S| ≥ 2 and is 0 otherwise. Notice that the game is symmetric and so are all the methods.
So it is sufficient to report the indices as a function of the size of the interaction term.
The Shapley value, defined only for singletons, are all 1/3. The Shapley values coin-
cide with the first order Shapley interaction indices and the Shapley-Taylor indices when
the order of explanation k = 1.
The pairwise Shapley interaction indices and the pairwise Banzhaf interaction
indices are all zero. This seems surprising—it is the co-occurrence pairs that has
a positive influence on the game. The three-way Shapley interaction index and the
three-way Banzhaf interaction index are both −2. This result is hard to interpret in
isolation—the quantity is negative and larger than the value of the game in magnitude.
The quantity is also had to interpret together with the lower order terms—For instance,
for Shapley interaction indices , the first-order terms are 1/3, the second-order terms
are zero. Summing all of these together results in −1, again a seemingly meaningless
number in the context of the majority game.
In contrast, Shapley-Taylor indices for k = 2 is 0 for the singleton sets and 1/3 for
each of the pairs. This appears intuitive—players cannot act alone in the game, and
the pairs determine the game. For k = 3, the Shapley-Taylor indices are zero for the
singleton sets, 1 each of the pairs, and −2 for the three-way interaction. This can be
seen as a refinement of the k = 2 case, reasserting that singletons are not influential,
that pairs have positive influence. Intriguingly, the three-way interaction is identical to
that of the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices. But in this case, we can interpret
the −2 as a consequence of efficiency.
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3 Axiomatization of the Shapley-Taylor Interaction In-
dex
In this section, we describe axiomatize Shapley-Taylor indices . Let GN denote the set
of games on N players.
The first three axioms are all variants of the standard Shapley axioms generalized to
interactions by [2]; they were used in the axiomatization of Shapley interaction indices .
1. Linearity axiom: Ik(·) is a linear function; i.e. for two games v, w ∈ GN ,
IkS(v + w) = IkS(v) + IkS(w) and IkS(c · v) = c · IkS(v).
2. Dummy axiom: If i is a dummy player for v, i.e. v(S) = v(S \ i) + v(i) for any
S ⊆ N with i ∈ S, then
(i) Iki (v) = v(i)
(ii) for every S ⊆ N with i ∈ S, we have IkS(v) = 0
3. Symmetry axiom: for all games v ∈ GN , for all permutations pi on N , :
IkS(v) = IkpiS(piv)
where piS := {pi(i)|i ∈ S} and the game piv is defined by (piv)(piS) = v(S), i.e.
it arises from relabeling of players 1, . . . , n with the labels pi(1), . . . , pi(n).
In addition to these three axioms from [2], we use the efficiency axiom. Again, this
is a generalization of the standard efficiency axiom for Shapley values.
4. Efficiency axiom: for all games v,
∑
S⊆N,|S|≤k IkS(v) = v(N)− v(∅)
Finally, we introduce the Interaction Distribution axiom. This axiom is defined for
games that we call interaction games. An interaction game parameterized by a set T ,
has the form vT (S) = 0 if T 6⊆ S and has a constant value vT (S) = c when T ⊆ S.
These games model pure interaction among the members of T (when |T | > 1—the
combined presence of the members of T is necessary and sufficient for the game to have
non-zero value. We call |T | the the order of the interaction of the interaction game.
5. Interaction Distribution Axiom: For an interaction game vT parameterized by
the set T , for all S with S ( T and |S| < k, where k denotes the order of
explanation, we have IkS(vT ) = 0.
This intention of the axiom is to ensure that higher order interactions are not
attributed to lower order terms or alternatively, that interaction terms of order (say)
o < k capture interactions of size o only. The axiom relaxes this restriction for terms
of size exactly k. This corresponds to the truncation in the representation of our
explanations. These terms will accumulate higher order interactions and allow the
method to satisfy efficiency. In a sense, they play the same role as a remainder in the
Taylor expansion. We discuss this further in Section 3.1.
We are now ready to state our main result:
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Theorem 1. Shapley-Taylor indices are the only interaction indices that satisfy axioms
1-5.
We’ll prove this theorem in Section 3.2. Before that we discuss the roles of various
axioms.
3.1 The Roles of the Axioms
Here we discuss informally the roles that the various axioms play, and specifically, the
need for the interaction distribution axiom. For simplicity, we consider explanations
of order k = 2. Consider the space of interaction distribution methods that satisfy
linearity. It is well-known that the set of unanimity games (defined as uT (S) = 1 if
T ⊆ S and 0 otherwise) constitute a basis for the space of all games. That is, every
game v, can be expressed as a unique linear combination of these games. By linearity,
the interaction indices for the game v should be the same linear combination of the
interaction indices for the unanimity games. Therefore, defining the interaction indices
for unanimity games specifies the interaction indices for all games.
Specifically, consider the unanimity game defined for a set T ⊆ N , such that
|T | > 1. Now let us consider the effect of the Dummy and Symmetry axioms. Dummy
constrains us from attributing to interaction terms that contain elements not in T .
Symmetry dictates that all the singleton elements in T get the same credit (say aT ), and
all the pairwise terms (i, j) such that i ∈ and j ∈ T , get the same credit (say bT ).
Recall that Shapley interaction indices satisfy Linearity, Dummy and Symmetry,
and as we show later, so do Shapley-Taylor indices . Pairwise Shapley interaction
indices assign a value of bT = 1/(|T | − 1) to every one of the
(|T |
2
)
pairs of elements.
Pairwise Shapley interaction indices does not define assignments to the singleton terms,
but for simplicity, we can consider aT = 0. Pairwise Shapley interaction indices thus
violate efficiency.
Shapley-Taylor indices assign a value of bT = 1/
(|T |
2
)
to every pair of elements
from the set T and aT = 0; this satisfies symmetry, dummy, linearity, but also efficiency.
However, this is not the unique way to satisfy efficiency; there are other assignments to
aT and bT that still satisfy efficiency. 1 This ambiguity is tied to non-orthogonality—
-the singleton sets are not orthogonal to the pairs. The consequence is that we need
an additional axiom to pin down the interaction index. In our case, the interaction
distribution axiom causes the explicit choice of setting the singleton assignments aT to
zero. This prevents the singleton elements from accumulating higher order interactions
(recall that we are discussing the case |T | > 1).
In contrast, notice that the assignment to the pairwise shares is reductive—the
pairwise shares capture not only the pairwise interactions (|T | = 2) , but also larger
interactions (|T | > 2). This reductiveness is necessitated by the constraint on the order
of explanation (k = 2) and the efficiency axiom. Notice that the very same reductiveness
1A different method is to apply the Shapley value to the Shapley value; i.e. treat the Shapley value
of an element itself as a set function and apply Shapley value on that set function. It turns out that this is
well-defined. Doing so sets aT = bT . While it is an open question to identify an axiom that causes this
assignment, this does show that the approach of explicitly defining interactions for interaction games (recall
that every basis function is an interaction games) is interesting beyond Shapley-Taylor indices .
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is present in the Shapley value (order of explanation k = 1); recall that the Shapley value
is the Shapley-Taylor indices when k = 1, see Section 3.4. In the Shapley value, all the
interactions are redistributed among the singleton shares. As we increase the order of
explanation, the amount of reductiveness decreases—progressively larger interactions
(of size k − 1 or less) are captured unambiguously. However, this is at the cost of more
computation and a longer explanation.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. First we show that Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy
the axioms. Next we show that any method that satisfies the axioms assigns specific
interaction values to unanimity games.
Theorem 2. Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy axioms 1-5.
We prove this in the next three propositions.
Proposition 1. Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy the Linearity, Dummy and Symmetry
axioms
Proof. In Equation 3, Shapley-Taylor indices are defined as expected values of certain
discrete derivatives δS . The discrete derivative satisfies linearity conditions. Hence
Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy the linearity axiom. The symmetry axiom follows from
the fact that Shapley-Taylor indices are defined as expectations over all permutations.
To show the dummy axiom, we note that the discrete derivative δSv(T ) can be rewritten
as δS\iv(T ∪ i) − δS\iv(T ) for any i ∈ S. If i is a dummy player, it follows that
δSv(T ) = 0. Consequently IkS(v) = 0. Furthermore, Ik{i}(v) = δiv(∅) = v(i). Thus
Shapley-Taylor indices also satisfy the dummy axiom.
Proposition 2. Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy the Interaction Distribution axiom.
Proof. Consider an interaction game vT and S such that |S| < |T |. Notice that
IkS(vT ) = δS(vT ) =
∑
W⊆S(−1)w−svT (W ). Since |W | < |T |, we know that
vT (W ) = 0. Hence IkS(vT ) = 0. This shows that Shapley-Taylor indices satisfies the
Interaction Distribution axiom.
Proposition 3. Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy the efficiency axiom. Formally,∑
S,|S|≤k
IkS(v) = v(N)− v(∅)
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
To finish the proof of Theorem1, we investigate interactions for unanimity games.
Recall that, a unanimity game parameterized by a set T ⊆ N is defined as uT (S) = 1
iff S ⊇ T , and 0 otherwise. Thus unanimity games are a subset of Interaction games
used for the Interaction Distribution Axiom.
Since the family of unanimity games {uT }T⊆N,T 6=∅ forms a linear basis of GN , it is
sufficient to show that any interaction index that satisfies the axioms 1-5 assigns specific
values on unanimity games. This is shown in the next proposition.
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Proposition 4. Consider the unanimity game uT defined as uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S,
otherwise 0. Let k be the order of explanation. Let φ be an interaction index that
satisfies the axioms 1-5, then
φS(uT ) =

1 if S = T and |S| < k
0 if S 6= T and |S| < k
1
(tk)
if S ⊆ T and |S| = k
0 |S| = k, but S 6⊆ T
(7)
Proof. Consider a unanimity game uT and an interaction index φS that satisfies axioms
1-5. We want to derive φS(uT ) using the axioms.
Start with the dummy axiom. If i 6∈ T , then i is a dummy player for uT . This
implies that if S \ T 6= ∅, then φS(uT ) = 0.
Consider |S| < k. The interaction distribution axiom states that φS(uT ) = 0 if
S ( T . Next we use the dummy axiom. Note that, for all j 6∈ T , δjuT (S) = 0. Thus
j is dummy player. The dummy axiom implies that φS(uT ) = 0 if j ∈ S. Hence,
φS(uT ) = 0 for all S such that |S \ T | > 0.
Using the efficiency axiom, we have
∑
S φS(uT ) = uT (N) = 1. As we saw before,
φS(uT ) = 0 if S 6= T . Hence the sum reduces to φS(uS) = 1, when S = T .
Finally, consider the case where size of S is same as the order of explanation, i.e.
|S| = k. As we saw earlier, φS(uT ) = 0 if S 6⊆ T . Using the efficiency axiom:∑
S⊆T φS(uT ) = 1. Furthermore, since k is the order of explanation, the interaction
index is defined to be 0 for sets larger than k. Hence,
∑
S⊆T,|S|=k φS(uT ) = 1.
The symmetry axiom implies that each of these terms must be equal. Hence
φS(uT ) =
1
(tk)
.
Proposition 4 shows that the interaction values for a unanimity game uT depend
only on |T | and the order of explanation k. Since unanimity games form a basis of GN ,
the interaction values extend in a unique way to all the games. Thus there is a unique
method (Shapley-Taylor indices ) that satisfies the axioms 1-5.
3.3 Closed form expression for Shapley-Taylor indices
In Section 2, we defined the Shapley-Taylor indices in terms of permutations. We now
derive a closed form expression for Shapley-Taylor indices in terms of δS , similar to the
definitions of Shapley interaction indices and Banzhaf interaction indices (Equations 5
and 6). This provides an alternate expression to compute Shapley-Taylor indices . We
have given the proof in Appendix.
Theorem 3. Let k be the order of explanation. For a set S ⊆ N , such that |S| = k,
Shapley-Taylor indices satisfy the following expression:
IkS(v) =
k
n
∑
T⊆N\S
δSv(T )
1(
n−1
t
)
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3.4 Connection to Taylor series
In this section, we study multilinear extensions of games. We show a one-to-one
correspondence between the terms in the Taylor series of the multilinear extension of a
game and the Shapley-Taylor indices of the game.
Multilinear extension of a game was first introduced by Owen [6]. He showed that
there is a unique multilinear function that coincides with v on the corners of the cube
{0, 1}N . The multilinear extension of v is defined as follows:
f(x) =
∑
S⊆N
v(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i 6∈S
(1− xi) (8)
where xi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N . The multilinear extension has a probabilistic interpretation:
if player i participates in the game with probability xi, then f(x) denotes the expected
value of the game.
Owen showed the connection between Shapley values and the partial derivatives of
f . In particular, integrating fj along the main diagonal of the cube gives Shapley value
φj(v) (here f(t) = f(t, t, . . . , t) denotes the main diagonal of the cube, for t ∈ [0, 1]).
Hammer and Rudeanu [3] showed that Equation 8 is equivalent to the following.
We use this definition in our proofs below.
f(x) =
∑
T⊆N
a(T )
∏
i∈T
xi (9)
We start with the (k − 1)th order Taylor expansion with Lagrange remainder:
f(1)− f(0) = f
′(0)
1!
+ . . .+
f (k−1)(0)
(k − 1)! +
∫ 1
t=0
(1− t)k−1
(k − 1)! f
(k)(t)dt (10)
We show that the the terms on the right side of this equation correspond to the
Shapley-Taylor indices for different sizes of sets.
First, we note that f(1) = v(N) and f(0) = v(∅).
Proposition 5. Let k be the order of explanation. The jth derivative of f is the sum of
interaction values over sets of size j < k.
f (j)(0)
j!
=
∑
|S|=j
IkS(v)
Proof. For a set S ⊆ N , |S| = j, define
∆Sf(x) :=
∂sf
∂xi1 . . . ∂xij
where S = {i1, . . . , ij}
Using Equation 9, we get
∆Sf(x) =
∑
T⊇S
a(T )
∏
i∈T\S
xi
10
For x = 0, we see that all the terms in above summation vanish except for T = S. This
gives us: ∆Sf(0) = a(S) = δSv(∅)
∆Sf(0) = IkS(v) (11)
Now we evaluate f (j)(0):
f (j)(0)
j!
=
1
j!
∑
i1
∑
i2
· · ·
∑
ij
∂jf(0)
∂xi1 . . . ∂xij
Notice that f is a multilinear function. Therefore, only the mixed partial terms survive.
Furthermore, all j! mixed partials wrt xi1 , . . . , xij are identical. Hence, we can simplify
the above equation to:
f (j)(0)
j!
=
∑
i1<i2<...<ij
∂jf(0)
∂xi1 . . . ∂xij
=
∑
S⊆N,|S|=j
∆Sf(0)
=
∑
S⊆N,|S|=j
IkS(v)
This proves the result.
Next we analyze the Lagrange Remainder term in Equation 10. Next proposition
establishes the connection to Shapley-Taylor indices .
Proposition 6. Let k be the order of explanation for Shapley-Taylor indices . The
Lagrange Remainder term is related to Shapley-Taylor indices as follows:
1
k!
∫ 1
t=0
(1− t)k−1f (k)(t)dt =
∑
S⊆N,|S|=k
IkS(v) (12)
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 5, the multilinearity of f means that only the
mixed partial terms survive:
f (k)(t)
k!
=
∑
S⊆N,|S|=k
∆Sf(t)
Using this summation in Lagrange remainder term and interchanging the order of
integral and summation, we get:
1
(k − 1)!
∫ 1
t=0
(1− t)k−1f (k)(t)dt =
∑
S⊆N,|S|=k
∫ 1
t=0
k(1− t)k−1∆Sf(t)dt (13)
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We evaluate the term inside the summation and show that it is indeed IkS(uT ). We
use Eqaution 9 to evaluate ∆Sf(t):
∫ 1
t=0
k(1− t)k−1∆Sf(t)dt =
∫ 1
t=0
k(1− t)k−1
∑
W⊇S
a(W )
∏
i∈W\S
t
 dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
k(1− t)k−1
 ∑
U⊆N\S
a(U ∪ S)tu
 dt by setting U = W \ S
=
∑
U⊆N\S
a(U ∪ S)k
∫ 1
t=0
tu(1− t)k−1dt
=
∑
U⊆N\S
a(U ∪ S) · k ·B(u+ 1, k) B(·, ·) is the Beta function
=
∑
U⊆N\S
a(U ∪ S)/
(
u+ k
k
)
=
∑
T⊇S
a(T )/
(
t
k
)
= IkS(v) from Equation 20 (see Appendix)
(14)
Along with Equation 13, this gives us
1
k!
∫ 1
t=0
(1− t)k−1f (k)(t)dt =
∑
S⊆N,|S|=k
IkS(v)
This finishes the proof.
As we have seen in Propositions 5 and 6, each of the Shapley-Taylor indices IkS(v)
is related to ∆Sf(x). For |S| < k, it is ∆Sf(0). For |S| = k, it is
∫ 1
t=0
k(1 −
t)k−1∆Sf(t)dt (Equations 11 and 14).
If we consider the case where k = 1, we see that the definition of Shapley-Taylor
indices in Equation 3 is exactly the Shapley value. Furthermore, Proposition 6 reduces
to the result by Owen [6] (Theorem 5). Thus the Shapley-Taylor indices are a strict
generalization of the Shapley values.
4 Examples
We now apply Shapley-Taylor indices (Shapley-Taylor indices ) to various games,
highlight insights from this application, and compare Shapley-Taylor indices to the
Shapley interaction indices and to Banzhaf interaction indices . We will focus on the
pairwise case (i.e., the order of explanation k is 2).
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4.1 Two Small Games
The first game is called the three person market game with one seller and two buyers.
The game has a value of 1 for sets that contain a seller and at least one of the two
buyers. It has a value of zero otherwise. The singleton Shapley-Taylor indices are
zero. The pairwise Shapley-Taylor indices between the buyer and a seller is: 2/3.
This makes sense because this pair is complementary. The pairwise Shapley-Taylor
indices between the two buyers is −1/3. This makes sense because this pair are
substitutes. The corresponding Shapley interaction indices and Banzhaf interaction
indices 2 for interactions between the buyer and a seller is 1/2 and between two buyers
is −1/2 respectively. The qualitative insights from all three methods are similar.
The second game is a four person game with one "big" player and three "small"
players. The game has a value of 1 for sets that contain a big player and at least one
of the three small players, or if the set contains all three small players. It has a value
of zero otherwise. Again, the singleton Shapley-Taylor indices are zero. The pairwise
Shapley-Taylor indices between the big and one of the small players is: 1/3. This makes
sense because this pair is complementary, just like a buyer-seller pair in the previous
game. The pairwise Shapley-Taylor indices between two small players is 0! Notice that
small players are substitutes in the presence of the big player but complements in the
absence of the big player. The two phenomena cancel each other out on average.
In contrast, all pairwise Shapley interaction indices and all pairwise Banzhaf inter-
action indices are zero, qualitatively suggesting that there is no interaction whatsoever,
which is not intuitive.
4.2 Majority Games
The majority game vmaj over the set of players N is defined by vmaj(S) = 1 if
|S| ≥ n/2 and is 0 otherwise; here n = |N |.
It is easy to check that the singleton terms for pairwise Shapley-Taylor indices for a
majority games are uniformly zero (for n > 2). The pairwise terms are each equal to
reciprocal of the number of pairs, 2/(n ∗ (n− 1)), a simple consequence of symmetry
and efficiency. The analytical conclusion from this is that majority games are all about
interaction, and this is intuitively reasonable.
In contrast, the pairwise Shapley interaction indices are uniformly zero for every
pairwise term for games (we exclude the calculation). This is unexpected; one would
imagine that in a three player majority game there would be non-zero interaction values
for sets of size 2, the size at which majority arises. The results from studying pairwise
Shapley interaction indices seems to suggest that there is no pairwise interaction!
However, Shapley interaction indices of larger interaction sizes do have non-zero values.
For instance, for a majority game with 3 players, the interaction value corresponding to
all three players is −2, a quantity that has no simple justification in itself. The pattern
becomes even more confusing for majority games of larger sizes.
Figure 1 shows the sum of the Shapley interaction indices (in log scale) for all
subsets of players for majority games as number of players increases. This displays two
2For pairwise interactions for 3 player games, Shapley interaction indices and Banzhaf interaction
indices happen to coincide.
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Figure 1: The sum of Shapley interaction indices (in log scale) for all subsets of players
for majority games as a function of the number of players.
non-intuitive characteristics. First, the total interaction diverges (recall the plot is in log
scale) despite the fact that the game value being shared among the players is constant
(1). Second, the sign of the total interaction alternates. In fact, for a game of a fixed size,
every non-singleton interaction value has the same sign. (So the sign alternation is not
due to cancellation across the interactions.) There is no intuitive reason for this sign
alternation.
Banzhaf Interaction Values exhibit a similar pattern of total interaction value to
Shapley interaction indices (also depicted in Figure 1). For pairwise interactions, where
the Shapley interaction indices was uniformly zero for games of all sizes, Banzhaf
interaction indices are zero for games with odd number of players and positive for
games with an even number of players.
This discussion highlights the value of the Shapley-Taylor indices interaction distri-
bution approach over that of Shapley interaction indices and Banzhaf interaction indices .
To study interactions using Shapley interaction indices or Banzhaf interaction indices ,
one has to compare 2n quantities, and even then the results appear unstable. In contrast,
studying O(n2) quantities using the Shapley-Taylor indices gives us some insight, no
matter what the size of the set of interacting elements.
4.3 Glove Game
In the glove game, the set N of players is the union of two disjoint sets L (left gloves)
and R (right gloves). The glove game vgl is defined by vgl(S) = min(S ∩ L, S ∩R),
i.e., the number of matching pairs of gloves in the set.
It is easy to check that the singleton terms for pairwise Shapley-Taylor indices for
a glove game are uniformly zero, as we would intuitively expect. The left players
are symmetric, and so are the right players. So there are only three different types of
pair-wise interactions: Those between players of the left set, those between players of
the right set, and those between the left and right players. We plot the values of these
interactions for a series of glove games with n = 10 players, where the number of left
glove players vary from 2 to 9. See Figure 2.
Left-right interactions are always positive, signifying the complementarity between
14
Figure 2: Variation of interactions by size of the left set for the glove game with
10players
the left and right sets. Left-left and Right-right interactions are always negative, signify-
ing the substitutability between elements within one type of set. Both the complementar-
ity and the substitutability are maximized when the left and right sets have the same size
(5); this is when the value of the game is maximized. As we would expect, the left-left
and right-right interaction curves are symmetric around the |L| = 5 point. Trends for
the Shapley interaction indices and Banzhaf interaction indices exhibit similar patterns;
we exclude these plots.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider a permutation pi and consider IkS,pi(v) defined by Equation 3. For
sets S such that |S| < k, we have IkS,pi(v) = δSv(∅). We define the sum of all the
Shapley-Taylor indices for a fixed size j as follows:
Mj :=
∑
|S|=j
IkS,pi(v)
=
∑
|S|=j
δSv(∅) (15)
=
∑
{i1<...<ij}
δ{i1,...,ij}v(∅) (16)
Now consider a set S of size k. Let piS = {i1, i2, . . . , ik}. W.l.o.g. assume
i1 < i2 < ... < ik. The set of predecessors of i1 in this permutation are {1, . . . , i1− 1}
etc. In fact, piS = {1, . . . , i1 − 1}.
Define the following sets:
Sj := {1, . . . , j} for j ≥ 1 and S0 := ∅
(17)
Now consider the following sum over different choices of i1:
∑
0<j<i2
Ik{j,i2,...,ik},pi(v) =
∑
0<j<i2
δ{j,i2,...,ik}v(S
j−1)
=
∑
0<j<i2
δ{i2,...,ik}v(S
j)− δ{i2,...,ik}v(Sj−1)
= δ{i2,...,ik}v({1, . . . , i2 − 1})− δ{i2,...,ik}v(∅)
This gives us the following equation:∑
0<j<i2
δ{j,i2,...,ik}v(S
j−1) = δ{i2,...,ik}v({1, . . . , i2 − 1})− δ{i2,...,ik}v(∅) (18)
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The base case is ∑
0<j≤n
δ{j}v(Sj−1) = v(N)− v(∅) (19)
We repeatedly apply Equation 18 and combine it with Equation 19 for the base case
to get ∑
{i1<...<ik}
δ{i1,i2,...,ik}v(S
i1−1) = v(N)− v(∅)−
∑
1≤j<k
Mj
Since, δ{i1,i2,...,ik}v(S
i1−1) = IkS,pi(v), we can rewrite above as
v(N)− v(∅) =
∑
1≤j<k
∑
|S|=j
IkS,pi(v) +
∑
|S|=k
IkS,pi(v)
This shows the efficiency axiom for each permutation pi. Since Shapley-Taylor in-
dices are defined as expectation over all permutations, it is easy to see that Shapley-
Taylor indices also satisfy the efficiency axiom.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. For a set T ⊆ N , define a(T ) (Möbius coefficients) as:
a(T ) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(S), T ⊆ N
Decomposition of any function v into unanimity games can be written in terms of a(T )’s
as follows:
v(S) =
∑
T⊆N
a(T )uT (S)
Using the linearity axiom, we can extend IkS from unanimity games to v as follows:
IkS(v) =
∑
T⊆N
a(T )IkS(uT )
Using the Shapley-Taylor indices for unanimity games from Proposition 4, we get:
=
∑
T⊆N,S⊆T
a(T )
1(
t
k
) (20)
=
∑
W⊆N\S
a(W ∪ S) 1(
w+k
k
) set W = T \ S
=
∑
W⊆N\S
∑
U⊆W
(−1)u−wδSv(U) 1(w+k
k
) use Lemma 1 below
=
∑
U⊆N\S
δSv(U)
∑
W⊇U,W⊆N\S
(−1)u−w(
w+k
k
) exchange summation
(21)
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Now we analyze the inner sum. We use the following identity:
(
w+k
k
)
= 1/(k ·
B(w + 1, k)), where B() is the Beta function.
∑
W⊇U,W⊆N\S
(−1)u−w(
w+k
k
) = ∑
W⊇U,W⊆N\S
(−1)u−wk ·B(w + 1, k)
= k
n−k∑
w=u
(
n− k − u
w − u
)
(−1)u−wB(w + 1, k)
= k
n−k∑
w=u
(
n− k − u
w − u
)
(−1)u−w
∫ 1
0
xw(1− x)k−1dx
= k
∫ 1
0
n−k∑
w=u
(
n− k − u
w − u
)
(−1)u−wxw(1− x)k−1dx exchange sum & integral
= k
∫ 1
0
xu(1− x)k−1
n−k−u∑
w′
(
n− k − u
w′
)
(−1)w′xw′dx setting w′ = w − u
= k
∫ 1
0
xu(1− x)k−1(1− x)n−k−udx
= kB(u+ 1, n− u) using Beta function
=
k
n
1(
n−1
u
)
We use this expression for the inner sum in the above equation to get:
IkS(v) =
k
n
∑
U⊆N\S
δSv(U)
1(
n−1
u
)
This finishes the proof.
The next Lemma provides a relation between the Möbius coefficients a(T ) and the
discrete derivatives.
Lemma 1. Möbius coefficients and discrete derivatives are related by following rela-
tion:
a(T ∪ S) =
∑
W⊆T
(−1)t−wδSv(W )
for S and T such that S ∩ T = ∅.
Proof.
a(T ) =
∑
W⊆T
(−1)t−sv(W )
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Let S and T be two sets such that S ∩ T = ∅. We have
a(T ∪ S) =
∑
W ′⊆T∪S
(−1)t+s−w′v(W ′)
=
∑
W⊆T
∑
U⊆S
(−1)t+s−w−uv(U ∪W ) writing W = W ′ ∩ T and U = W ′ ∩ S
=
∑
W⊆T
(−1)t−w
∑
U⊆S
(−1)s−uv(U ∪W )
=
∑
W⊆T
(−1)t−wδSv(W )
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